By the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union was bogged down in Afghanistan even as a new generation of leadership was emerging in Moscow. The new Soviet leadership realized that time was running out on their Afghan adventure, and they made significant strategic adjustments to try to rescue what they could from what was shaping up to be a failure of epic proportions. First, they shifted their military strategy away from combating a rural insurgency to controlling the population centers and the road corridor that connected them. Second, they tried to change the unpopular puppet government they had installed and took measures to boost its popularity, primarily through a reconciliation program. Third, the Soviets concentrated on building a competent Afghan army and security forces to which they could hand off the job of Afghan security. It appears that the United
States is trying to do all of these things again today, as if the Soviet experience never happened.
Below we address the similarities in the Soviet and U.S. approaches to Afghanistan; the three similarities addressed are central to current U.S. and NATO Afghan strategies: the focus on key population centers, reconciliation, and the development of "Afghan" solutions to a variety of security concerns.
POPULATION-CENTRIC STRATEGY?
The vast majority of the Afghan population (75-80 percent) lives scattered across the countryside, from which all previous Afghan rebellions have originated. Soviet strategies initially focused on controlling the cities and key transportation routes, while launching search and destroy missions into the countryside in an effort to destroy insurgent sanctuaries and depopulate rural Afghanistan. The Geneva Accords of April 1988 that established a timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan prompted a switch to a strategy that kept most Soviet troops on relatively secure bases and/or in concentric circles around the larger towns and cities. In addition to garrisoned soldiers, some Soviet troops, as well as Afghan government forces, were used to hold the main "Ring Road" that connects Afghan urban areas. This urban population-centric strategy, in conjunction with a massive aid program, helped facilitate the Soviet withdrawal and also the continued (albeit temporary) maintenance of the Afghan Communists in power through control of the towns, cities, and main roads, while the mujahedeen operated relatively freely in the remaining 80 percent of Afghanistan -the Afghan rural hinterland. By fall 1991, nearly two and a half years after the completion of the Soviet withdrawal, Russian President Boris Yeltsin cut off supplies to Afghanistan. The Afghan Communist government fell apart almost immediately, although the mujahedeen did not take Kabul until April 1992.
Shortly after being named the new commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan in 2009, General Stanley
McChrystal asserted that the situation in Afghanistan required a new strategy that focused on the Afghan population. In practical terms, this new strategy would mean that U.S., NATO, and allied forces would concentrate their efforts on "key districts" that included a "meaningful proportion of the Afghan population" (that is, larger towns and cities), as well as the road network that connects them. The old "enemy-centric" strategy that produced multiple operations-multiple maneuver element search and destroy missions every year, often conducted in remote mountainous or rural areas by an individual country's contingent of forces, would apparently be relegated to the past.
McChrystal's focus on the key population centers, which for the most part has been continued by General David Petraeus who took over the command of U.S. and ISAF Forces from McChrystal in June 2010, is very similar to the ineffective city-centric strategy followed 25 years earlier by the Soviets. Like the mujahedeen a generation earlier, this is not where the Taliban primarily operate and when they do they are extremely difficult to identify or separate from the population. It is a military dictum that it is virtually impossible to defeat a rural insurgency in a largely agrarian country by securing the urban areas. The Soviets eventually learned this; apparently the United States has yet to do so.
UNPOPULAR GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTS RECONCILIATION PROGRAM
Despite the brutality of a Soviet war that cost the Afghans more than one million killed to about 15,000 Soviet dead, the Soviets and PDPA government pursued reconciliation programs during the 1980s, especially in northern Afghanistan where they attempted to promote common traditions and practices as a way to pacify various ethno-linguistic groups along the AfghanSoviet Central Asian border. Cultural delegations to promote understanding between the Soviet occupiers and a variety of northern Afghan ethno-linguistic groups appeared frequently in the northern provinces, and the Soviets even tried to reconcile with local religious leaders through a restored "Society of Ulema" (Muslim legal scholars). In addition, the Soviets pursued programs that allowed traditional Afghan leaders (tribal elders and religious figures) to have some influence in government in exchange for loyalty to it via reconciliation.
3 Finally, Soviet resources were used in an attempt to co-opt entire communities into the service of the government. The Soviets often enticed through the traditional system of patronage by providing a group with money and armaments in exchange for its support, either in the form of active operations against the resistance or simply keeping the area free of mujahedeen.
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After the Soviets replaced Babrak Karmal with Najibullah in 1986, Najibullah made significant reconciliation overtures to the mujahedeen until the early 1990s in an attempt to end the conflict. An Afghan National Reconciliation program was initiated that was based partly on a new constitution that provided for legislative institutions of government and did away with the single-party Revolutionary Council that had previously helped rule the country. The mujahedeen were even offered seats in the government, including control over key ministries, but only if they would reconcile and end the fighting; such offers were consistently rejected by the mujahedeen.
Similiarly, since early 2003, President Hamid Karzai has called for national reconciliation with the Taliban with the express purpose to reconcile warring parties in an attempt to bring peace to Afghanistan. Program Takhim-e Sohl (PTS) 5 was established in 2005 and has been a keystone of Karzai's strategy, although at times some of his support for these programs appears to be little more than self-promoting propaganda, or even disinformation. Despite the reconciliation of a very few highly-placed Taliban and insurgent leaders early on in the program, meaningful reconciliation of influential Taliban has been minimal. And few Taliban foot soldiers have laid down their arms. Moreover, the highly touted peace assembly, or "Peace Jirga," of tribal elders and powerbrokers was held in May 2010 to systematically address reconciliation, but its success thus far has been more publicity than substance. Even Ambassador Karl Eikenberry has "warned that the money associated with reintegration risked 'creating perverse incentives, short-changing individuals and communities that have not fed the insurgency.'" 6 Much of the failure of the reconciliation (as well as negotiation) policies are because the Taliban insurgency is best defined as an insurgency wrapped in the narrative of jihad. History would suggest that secular insurgents negotiate, jihadists do not. Rather, the Taliban that matter most within the movement are jihadists with perceived intense religious obligations (for instance, Mullah Omar, the Amir ul-Momineen, or Leader of the Faithful). "Peeling" such individuals away from the Taliban is virtually impossible because they believe they are following the mandates of a higher calling. Indeed, history suggests that no jihad has ever ended with a negotiated settlement or via reconciliation. Additionally, negotiation is not a tactic of the strong in Afghanistan, so when a government struggling with a resilient insurgency announces reconciliation and negotiation efforts as a centerpiece of its strategy, most Afghans figure the government is losing. Why would the Taliban, emboldened in the belief they are on the verge of victory (after all, the United States announced that it would begin to withdraw in July 2011), want to negotiate or reconcile? Nevertheless, the notion of political settlements and diplomatic negotiations is difficult for Washington to dismiss even when political and cultural realities make them unrealistic because such strategies are so ingrained in the American diplomatic psyche. local and village level of rural Pashtun society, for whom dynastic and religious authority has been paramount for millennia.
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Just as the present Kabul government is having an extremely difficult time establishing legitimacy, so too did the Afghan government during the Soviet occupation struggle. The PDPA was never popular with the vast majority of the Afghan people and obviously could not derive any legitimacy from the sources suggested above.
Security cannot come from a strong foreign force on behalf of rulers that people view as corrupt, inefficient, and ineffective. Nor can it come from a domestic army led by those elites. Historically, the Afghan state could be predatory and extractive, as long as it was not intrusive or engaged in social engineering in the countryside. Even if the government has dynastic or religious sources of legitimacy, historically it still had to enter into a bargain with local elites in the countryside and provincial centers. Such bargains were lubricated with patronage, so that local elites could have power and dispense goods and services to their people, while simultaneously keeping the unpredictable Kabul government at bay. The system of government that was imposed on Afghanistan after 9/11 by the West and those Afghan elites who benefitted from it was highly centralized, although the initial economy of force counterterrorism military strategy meant that local warlords were allowed to persist as augmentation to the inadequate outside and national forces engaged in security provision. Also, while money has poured into the country for a multitude of reasons, there has been little success in connecting the economic largesse to the development of governmental legitimacy. In fact, just the opposite has occurred, whereby the new Afghan political elites at the central levels have enriched themselves so obscenely that the post-9/11 windfall has diminished rather than enhanced governmental legitimacy.
Likewise, there has been almost no meaningful effort to pursue justice, a concept at the core of Islamic notions of good governance, and especially critical in post-conflict societies. When so much blood has been spilled by so many people within a society for such a long period of time, some mechanism for transitional justice is needed to break the cycle of bloodshed, such as the famous "Truth and And, Afghanistan has long been the "crossroads of Asia," meaning that it is even a bigger prize because it holds the key to anywhere else in the region. For all of these reasons no strategy can be successful that does not take into account the way regional actors may act.
These are the realities of Afghanistan that shape the environment in which a strategy must be constructed and implemented. There is one additional factor of great consequence, which is that public opinion in the West no longer supports a long, expensive, and frustratingly uncertain war in Afghanistan. For NATO to continue to act out of area and the United States to stay long enough for all of the strategic initiatives to ripen will require a level of success that does not seem likely to occur.
Thus, there are probably three potential strategies left to us. They are:
• Better Nation-Building through COIN -This approach is predicated on a belief that only through nation-building can the root causes of Afghanistan's problems be resolved. It essentially accepts that a heavy American presence is required to bring about enough good governance and development for success. However, U.S. and allied countries have found their support for a continued, expensive engagement declining, and the manifest corruption and ineffectiveness of the Afghan government does not instill confidence that this approach is working. Moreover, President Obama has already announced a July 2011 timetable for the beginning of an American withdrawal of combat forces.
• Counterterrorism is Enough -A counterterrorism approach does not accept the necessity of nation-building-or at least holds that such a commitment of means is not justified by the ends. Instead, adherents of this approach, increasingly in the ascendance in Washington, believe that the United States and its allies can achieve minimal national security goals through the relatively secretive activities of counterterrorism specialists. While such an approach may not resolve underlying problems and, indeed, might only be a variation of the containment strategy that was employed against the Taliban in the 1990s, this is much more sustainable than the big COIN nation-building approach.
• Declare Victory and Disengage -It may be that the only strategy worth considering is one that abandons Afghanistan to its own fate. After all, the United States has already spent $227 billion on Afghanistan (in direct military spending), 24 a country whose rapid GDP growth rates of the post-9/11 era have allowed it to get its national budget up to $4 billion per year (almost entirely based on foreign aid). Also, the United States has achieved all of its initial objectives in Afghanistan, at least to some extent. If U.S. interests have changed and the ends now justify a greater deployment of forces and more expenditure of money, then such a case must be made with clarity and conviction.
We are reluctant to suggest complete abandonment, in part because other key countries are now engaged in Afghanistan in ways that threaten U.S. interests and partly because the earlier era of U.S. disengagement saw the advent of the Taliban, al Qaeda, and eventually 9/11. Moreover, there is an argument to be made that Afghanistan presents the United States with a remarkable opportunity for international leadership that, despite some difficulties along the way, is still not lost to us. However, we are not convinced that the United States should pursue the expensive and obvious strategy followed by the Soviets when it failed so miserably for them. That leaves us unenthusiastically in favor of using counterterrorism to achieve America's most pressing security interests in Afghanistan, with regional diplomatic and development efforts as critical enablers.
Afghanistan needs a good government that has legitimacy with its population, dispenses justice, spreads economic benefits, and lives peacefully with its neighbors as a hub of Asian trade. Perhaps it needs a constitutional monarchy with an appropriate role for the Ulema, as in other Islamic countries, and a reconstituted, empowered system of local governance. The projected mineral wealth and geostrategic location might very well provide the foundation for an economic miracle. And with proper investment in infrastructure and human capital, Afghanistan could be built into a functioning twenty-first-century country. But none of this will happen quickly and history suggests that economies built on extractive industries face their own unique problems. Moreover, these otherwise admirable goals cannot be provided by the United States or other outside powers, and the Soviet experience shows that staying too long in Afghanistan carries its own costs. Above all else, the Soviet experience shows us the painful mistakes of the past, and we ignore those mistakes at our peril. Otherwise, as George Santayana once warned us, "Those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it." 
